The Impact of Single Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime by Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith
The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures 
on Neighborhood Crime 
 
Abstract 
Foreclosures of single-family mortgages have increased dramatically in many 
parts of the U.S. in recent years. Much of this has been tied to the rise of higher-risk 
subprime mortgage lending. Debates concerning mortgage regulation, as well as debates 
about other residential finance policies and practices, hinge critically on the social as well 
as personal costs of loan default and foreclosure.  
In this paper, we examine the impact of foreclosures of single-family mortgages – 
both conventional and government guaranteed – on levels of violent and property crime 
at the neighborhood level. Using data on foreclosures, neighborhood characteristics, and 
crime, we find that higher foreclosure levels do contribute to higher levels of violent 
crime. The results for property crime are not statistically significant. A standard deviation 
increase in the foreclosure rate (about 2.8 foreclosures for every 100 owner-occupied 
properties in one year) corresponds to an increase in neighborhood violent crime of 
approximately 6.7 percent. 
1. Introduction 
 
In March 2000, Mayor Richard M. Daley of Chicago held a press conference in 
front of a boarded-up brick bungalow on Chicago’s southwest side to announce a 
proposed ordinance aimed at reducing mortgage foreclosures in city neighborhoods 
(Washburn, 2000). The mayor compared the “menace” of abusive mortgage lending and 
resulting foreclosures to the problem of criminal street gangs. He went on to say that 
“vacant buildings are ugly. They attract gangs….They are the most frequent problems 
encountered by the (community policing program) and by block clubs and community 
organizations” (Spielman, 2000).  In the next few months, a high-profile series of six 
murders in abandoned buildings in one South Side neighborhood brought increased 
attention to the problem of abandoned buildings. By September, the city had passed the 
first municipal ordinance in the country aimed at reducing predatory lending. Supporters 
of the law continually referred to the scourge of abandoned buildings stemming from 
high-risk home loans as a principal reason for passing the law. 
Community concern over the problem of boarded-up and abandoned buildings, 
many of which stemmed from increased mortgage foreclosures, provided important 
political support for passage of the city’s hotly contested predatory lending ordinance. 
Certainly concern for the more direct victims of predatory mortgages and the other 
effects that blighted buildings may have on a community played a role as well, but the 
notion that such buildings lead to increased crime was a critical factor. Yet despite the 
clear convictions of the mayor and many other policymakers and community groups 
around the country that vacant and abandoned homes can lead to crime, the systematic 
research in this area is quite scarce. In fact, we are aware of only one study that 
systematically links abandoned buildings to crime and none that measure the effect of 
foreclosures on crime. Spencer (1993) found that crime rates on blocks with open 
abandoned buildings were twice as high as rates on similar blocks without open 
buildings. 
In this paper, we seek to measure the effect of foreclosures of single-family 
homes on levels of violent and property crime at the neighborhood level. We do not 
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suggest that any effect of foreclosures on crime is more important than other harm that 
foreclosures might cause. Effects on the directly affected households as well as other 
neighborhood impacts (e.g., aesthetics, stability, or property value) may be as or more 
important than any effects on crime. However, effects on crime are clearly of concern, 
especially in many of the neighborhoods that have been hit hard by the growing levels of 
foreclosures in cities across the U.S. 
2. The Foreclosure Problem 
Nationally, foreclosure levels in the U.S. have generally risen significantly since 
the 1970s.  During the 1980s, foreclosure rates on conventional loans rose significantly 
from about 0.3 to 0.4 percent up to levels of around 0.8 percent by the end of the decade 
(Elmer and Seelig, 1998). This may have been expected to some degree due to the strong 
economic restructuring during the 1980s. However, even as the economy improved in the 
latter part of the decade foreclosure rates increased. In the 1990s, despite a strong 
economy during most of the decade, foreclosures continued a generally upward trend, 
reaching 1.04 percent by 1997. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the pattern remained 
one of historically high foreclosure levels, peaking at 1.3 percent in late 2003 before 
declining a bit in 2004 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2004).  
States like Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and 
Mississippi all had foreclosure rates above 2 percent in late 2003 (Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, 2004).  Twenty-three states saw increases in foreclosures of more 
than 24 percent from the end of 2001 to the end of 2003, with eight of these seeing 
increases of more than 50 percent over the period. While the weak economy certainly 
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contributed to this problem, the magnitude of these increases was particularly large and is 
certainly related to the underlying vulnerability of the mortgages to economic downturns. 
Immergluck and Smith (2005) show that, in the Chicago area, foreclosure starts 
rose 238 percent from 1995 to 2002. Although foreclosures of government-guaranteed 
mortgages rose by 105 percent, conventional foreclosures increased at a much faster pace 
of 350 percent. As a result, while conventional loans accounted for only slightly more 
than half of foreclosures in 1995, they accounted for almost three out of four just seven 
years later. Much of the increased foreclosure activity in the Chicago area was 
concentrated in lower-income and minority communities. Neighborhoods with minority 
populations of less than 10 percent in 2000 saw an increase in foreclosures of 215 
percent, while neighborhoods with 90 percent or greater minority populations 
experienced an increase of 544 percent. Neighborhoods with 90 percent or more minority 
residents in 2000 accounted for 40 percent of the 1995-2002 increase in conventional 
foreclosures. These same tracts represent only 9.2 percent of the owner-occupied housing 
units in the region. Tracts with 50 percent or greater minority populations accounted for 
more than 61 percent of the increase in conventional foreclosures. 
Foreclosures can entail significant costs and hardships for the families affected. 
McCarthy, VanZandt, and Rohe (2000) describe how foreclosures can involve losing not 
only accumulated home equity and the costs associated with acquiring the home, but also 
access to stable, descent housing. Moreover, foreclosures can damage credit ratings, 
hurting the owners’ prospects not only in credit markets but also in labor and insurance 
markets and in the market for rental housing. Moreno (1995) estimated average losses to 
a foreclosed family of $7,200. 
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But the economic and social costs of foreclosures may affect more than the 
families most directly involved. Foreclosures can have implications for surrounding 
neighborhoods and even for their larger communities. Cities, counties, and school 
districts may lose tax revenue from abandoned homes. In examining FHA foreclosures, 
for example, Moreno (1995) estimated average city costs of $27,000 and neighborhood 
costs of $10,000.  Moreover, these figures do not account for all of the social and psychic 
costs of foreclosures, either to the family or the community. One of the possible social 
costs is increased crime. 
3. Subprime Lending and Increasing Foreclosures in Urban Areas 
The problem of high foreclosure levels in recent years has been linked to the 
increasing activity of subprime mortgage lenders that specialize in lending to borrowers 
with imperfect credit. A number of studies have identified some relationship between 
subprime lending and foreclosures at the neighborhood level (Burnett, Herbert, and Kaul, 
2002; Collins, 2003; Gruenstein and Herbert, 2000; Newman and Wyly, 2004). In 
Atlanta, Abt and Associates found that foreclosures attributed to subprime lenders 
accounted for 36 percent of all foreclosures in predominantly minority neighborhoods in 
1999, while their share of loan originations was between 26 and 31 percent in the 
preceding three years (Greunstein and Herbert, 2000). In Essex County, New Jersey, 
researchers found that the percent of foreclosures attributed to subprime lenders increased 
from 19 percent in 1995 to 30 percent in 2000, though they also admitted that these 
figures substantially underestimated the subprime share of foreclosures (Newman and 
Wyly, 2004).  
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These studies generally tend to underestimate the proportion of foreclosures due 
to subprime originators because many subprime loans are sold to financial institutions 
identified by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development as “prime” 
lenders or are held in trusts at prime lending institutions (usually banks). Thus, 
foreclosures of subprime loans sold to prime lenders or trusts would list only the prime 
lender who currently holds the loan, not the originating subprime lender.  The reverse 
generally does not occur. That is, subprime lenders do not tend to buy loans from prime 
lenders and generally do not have trust capacity.   
Immergluck and Smith (2005) find that subprime lending has a very substantial 
effect on foreclosures. In the case of refinance lending, for example, a tract with 100 
more subprime loans over a five-year period (compared to a standard deviation of 73 
loans), other things equal, corresponds to almost eight foreclosures in the year following 
this period. The effect of subprime lending on foreclosures is generally on the order of 20 
to 30 times the effect of prime lending, after controlling for neighborhood economic and 
demographic conditions. 
Quercia, Stegman, and Davis (2005) find that 20.7 percent of all first-lien 
subprime refinance loans originated in 1999 had entered foreclosure by December 2003 
and that the rate at which subprime loans entered foreclosure in late 2003 was more than 
10 times the rate for prime loans. 
4. Foreclosures, Boarded-Up and Abandoned Homes, and Physical Disorder 
Before analyzing the effect of foreclosed homes on neighborhood crime, it is 
important to place this research in the context of a substantial literature on the effect on 
neighborhood crime of what sociologists refer to as social and physical disorder. Vacant 
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and abandoned buildings are often considered a component of neighborhood physical 
disorder (as opposed to social disorder). Physical disorder involves “signs of negligence 
and unchecked decay” in a neighborhood (Skogan, 1990, p. 4). Physical disorder refers 
more to sustained conditions than to particular events. However, these conditions are, of 
course, created by events and actions. Moreover, Skogan (1990, p. 36) suggests that 
physical disorder is more often caused by legal, if destructive, actions by perpetrators 
rather than by criminals or offenders. Social disorder, on the other hand, is composed of 
specific undesirable events and behavior (e.g., aggressive panhandling or public drinking) 
that may in turn cause more serious problems, including crime, although this causation is 
disputed (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). 
Several observers and researchers have argued that physical and social disorder 
causes crime (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Kelling and Coles, 1996; Skogan, 1991). They 
argue that disorder undermines the ways in which communities maintain social control.  
Fewer residents are concerned about or take responsibility for disorder in public spaces 
outside their own households. Criminals flock to such communities because they do not 
fear being caught. Thus, social and physical disorder leads to more serious criminal acts. 
However, Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) argue that disorder is not typically a 
cause of crime, but that many elements of disorder are a component—perhaps not always 
well measured—of crime itself.  Moreover, they argue that physical disorder, such as 
smashed windows and drug vials in the streets, is evidence either of crime or violations of 
ordinances.  
Given this definition of physical disorder, vacant and abandoned houses should be 
seen as a phenomenon distinct from disorder. While some vacant or abandoned homes 
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may be in violation of housing ordinances, the conditions of the homes are rarely caused 
by the violations. While such buildings may be the result of illegal activity or social 
disorder on the part of those having some physical presence in the neighborhood, they are 
generally unlikely to be. An act of arson can result in abandonment if the owner of the 
victimized house lacks adequate insurance. However, if a homeowner suffers a crisis of 
some kind and cannot pay her mortgage, her home may be foreclosed upon and the house 
may become vacant and then perhaps boarded up and eventually abandoned. While the 
effect of this calamity is to increase neighborhood blight, the causation is quite external 
and not caused by local crime, ordinance violations, or social disorder. It may have more 
to do with a layoff at an employer far from the neighborhood. Likewise, if an abandoned 
building results from a foreclosure due to a high-risk subprime mortgage loan, no local 
crime or ordinance violation was instrumental in creating the problem. 
Skogan (1990) argues that abandoned buildings can harm a neighborhood in 
different ways. First, they can harbor decay. They may be havens for trash, rats, or other 
stray animals, squatters, or even criminals. Abandoned houses may also be used as places 
where drugs are sold and used or used by predatory criminals who may attack 
neighborhood residents. Finally, abandoned or vacant homes may be targets of 
vandalism, the theft of wiring or other building components, or arson. However, property 
theft from such buildings may be less likely to be reported than theft from occupied 
buildings.  Indirectly, the presence of boarded-up and abandoned buildings may lead to a 
lack of collective concern by neighborhood residents with neighborhood crime.  
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5. Methods and Data 
To identify the effect of foreclosures on neighborhood crime, we begin by 
attempting to estimate neighborhood crime rates by the following equation: 
 
lnCi =  a + b1Pi + b2Bi + b3Zi + b4Fi +  εi   (1) 
 
where lnCi is the natural log of the number of crime incidents in census tract i, which will 
later be disaggregated into violent and property crime. Pi  is the population of the tract, Bi  
is the number of businesses in the tract, and Zi is a vector of resident characteristics that 
might be expected to affect neighborhood crime rates based on the literature. Fi is the 
tract foreclosure rate, measured by the number of foreclosures divided by the number of 
owner-occupiable housing units in tract i.1   
While some attempts to estimate neighborhood crime levels use per capita crime rates 
as the dependent variable (Kubrin and Squires, 2004), we prefer a specification that 
begins with the absolute value of crime incidents as a function of both population level, 
the number of businesses, and characteristics of the population. First, violent crimes 
occur against those who work as well as those who live in neighborhoods. Neighborhood 
retail centers and business clusters are frequently crime “hot spots.” In the case of 
property crime, we might expect the number of businesses to be an especially strong 
factor. Ideally, we would have additional information on the businesses, particularly total 
number of employees in the tract, but such data are not available at a census tract level.  
                                                 
1 Owner-occupiable units is calculated by taking the percent of occupied units that are owner-occupied and 
multiplying it by the total number of housing units in the tract, including vacant units. 
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The dependent variable is transformed as the log of the raw crime figure because the 
crime figures are substantially skewed in their distribution. Logging these variables 
creates dependent variables that follow the normal distribution much more closely, 
fulfilling an important assumption of ordinary least squares regression. To illustrate this 
point, Figure 1 compares the distribution of total crime and the log of total crime. 
Coincidentally, the resulting semilog functional form provides for a convenient 
interpretation of the coefficients of the independent variables. That is, the coefficients 
represent the percentage change in absolute crime levels for a one-unit change in the 
independent variable. 
To estimate equation (1), we combine tract-level data from the 2000 census, business 
count data from Dun and Bradstreet, and crime data from the Chicago police department 
for tracts in the central city. The available police and business count data are from 2001.  
Crime data are aggregated into violent crime and property crime, the sum of which yields 
total crime. Based on recent literature on neighborhood crime (Kubrin and Squires, 2004; 
Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbusch, 2001), we constructed the following variables 
describing resident characteristics that might be expected to affect neighborhood crime 
rates: 
1) the proportion of residents living below the poverty line in 1999; 
2) the proportion of residents on public assistance in 2000; 
3) median family income in 1999; 
4) the unemployment rate in 2000; 
5) the percent of residents who are black; 
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6) the percent of residents who are Hispanic;2 
7) the proportion of residents who are males aged 14 to 24; 
8) the proportion of households headed by females and with children below 18; 
9) the proportion  of persons 15 and over who are divorced; 
10) the proportion of persons age 5 and above who have changed residences in the 
last five years (percent recent residents); and 
11) the proportion of occupied housing units occupied by renters 
Table 1 gives the mean and standard deviation of the dependent and independent 
variables used in estimating equation (1). Table 2 gives the Pearson correlations between 
the dependent variables and each of the independent variables. As expected, population 
and number of businesses are positively correlated with crime levels, although the 
correlation between number of businesses and violent crime is quite weak. This is 
somewhat expected because businesses are a major target of property crime. Many of the 
demographic variables are significantly correlated at substantial levels with violent crime. 
These variables include proportion of female-headed households, percent black, 
proportion on public assistance, median family income (negative sign) and, importantly, 
foreclosure rate. The correlations with property crime are smaller and generally at lower 
significance levels. Of course, these are just simple bivariate correlations and tell us 
relatively little about how foreclosure rate or any of the other variables independently 
affect crime. 
  
 
                                                 
2 Kubrin and Squires (2004) do not include percent Hispanic in their study of Seattle neighborhoods. In 
Chicago, however, well over 20 percent of the population is Hispanic and Hispanic segregation is significant. 
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Ordinary least squares regression was used to estimate equation (1) with all of the 
independent variables listed in Table 2. However, in examining the partial regression 
plots for all independent variables a significant nonlinearity was identified for the 
residential population variable. Figure 2 is the partial regression plot of the total crime 
residual versus population, together with a fitted quadratic curve. It demonstrates the 
nonlinear nature of the impact of population on the dependent variable. To correct for 
this, we add the square of population as an independent variable. This improves the 
regression fit significantly (from R-square = 0.717 to R-square = 0.750). 
 Table 3 gives the results of the estimation of equation (1) for all three dependent 
variables (violent crime, property crime, and total crime) with the square-of-population 
included along with the original independent variables listed in Table 2. As predicted by 
the examination of the partial plots, the sign of the coefficient for population is positive, 
but for population squared it is negative. Therefore, crime incidents increase with 
population but increase at a slower rate at higher population levels. This nonlinearity 
appears to be somewhat stronger in the case of violent crime than in the case of property 
crime.   
The nonlinearity in the effect of population on crime may be due to a problem of 
crime occurring to employees working in what are essentially nonresidential tracts or 
some other phenomenon. For example, tracts with larger populations may have more 
street activity or “eyes on the street,” providing a deterrent to crime (Jacobs, 1961). 
As anticipated, the number of businesses in a tract has a significant effect on 
crime rates. The marginal effect is substantially larger for property crime than for violent 
crime. Standardized coefficients suggest that variations in business counts are a 
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substantial determinant of property crime (beta = 0.237) and also affect violent crime 
levels in a nontrivial way (beta = 0.119). 
 Six of the demographic characteristic variables are statistically significant 
determinants of neighborhood violent crime. These include percent black, percent 
Hispanic, the proportion below poverty, the proportion of families headed by single 
females, the proportion renting, and the proportion that have moved in the last five years. 
The signs of all of these variables are as expected. Four demographic characteristics are 
statistically significant determinants of neighborhood property crime, including 
proportion divorced, proportion that have moved in the last five years, percent Hispanic, 
and percent black. Again, the signs are as expected. 
 The key variable of interest here is the foreclosure rate variable. This variable is a 
statistically significant determinant of violent crime but not of property crime. Partly 
because property crime figures are higher than violent crime figures, the variable is also 
not significant in the total crime regression. The foreclosure rate is significant in the 
violent crime regression and not in the property crime regression due to the much larger 
magnitude of the coefficient in the violent crime result (2.328 versus 0.084).  
The nature of the semilog functional form makes the interpretation of the effect of 
higher foreclosure rate on violent crime relatively straightforward. The coefficient gives 
the percentage change in violent crime given a one-unit increase in the independent 
variable. Because a one-unit change in the independent variable is absurdly large (the 
standard deviation is only 0.0287), we instead consider the expected change in violent 
crime due to a one-standard-deviation change in the independent variable. A 0.0287 
increase in the foreclosure rate yields an expected increase in violent crime of 6.68 
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percent. A smaller increase in the neighborhood foreclosure rate, of say 1 in 100 
properties, would yield an increase in violent crime of 2.33 percent. 
6. Concerns about Multicollinearity 
Although not examining the role of foreclosures, Kubrin and Squires (2004) find a 
similar estimation of neighborhood crime rates in Seattle to be afflicted by problems of 
multicollinearity and employ principal components analysis to reduce the number of 
independent variables. Therefore, when estimating equation (1), we examined diagnostics 
for collinearity quite carefully. While we found significant bivariate correlations among 
some of these variables, multivariate collinearity diagnostics did not suggest that 
collinearity was a major problem. Variance inflation factors were examined and none 
exceeded 7 before the square of population variable was added. Even after this variable 
was added, all variance inflation factors remained under 10 and most remained under 5. 
Moreover, the regression was re-run using standardized independent variables to compute 
a collinearity condition index. The condition index was less than 10 even after the square 
of population variable was added. Thus, the diagnostics did not suggest that 
multicollinearity was a serious problem, and no data reduction techniques were used. 
7. Checking for Possible Simultaneity 
Another possible concern with the results in Table 3 is that the model used may 
ignore simultaneity between foreclosure rate and crime. That is, we examine whether 
violent crime could cause higher foreclosure rates as well as the other way around.  If 
simultaneity occurs, the results in Table 3 would result in biased coefficients. To address 
this potential problem, we conduct a Hausman test for simulataneity (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1991, pp. 303-05).  To do this, we first need to identify an instrument that is 
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significantly correlated with the foreclosure rate but that is uncorrelated with the residual 
in the results of the regression from Table 3. A variable that meets these criteria is 
median home value. This variable is negatively correlated with foreclosure rate (-0.395) 
and uncorrelated with the regression residual. Once we have this value, we regress the 
instrument and the exogeneous independent variables (excluding foreclosure rate) on 
foreclosure rate. We then take the resulting residual and include it as an additional 
independent variable in the estimation of tract crime (equation 1).  The results (shown in 
the Appendix) of this exercise show that the residual does not come in as a statistically 
significant predictor of tract crime (significance level equals 0.317). This means that 
there is no evidence that simultaneity is a problem in the results in Table 3.  
8. Conclusions and Implications for Planning and Policy 
 The problems of foreclosures are certainly not limited to their impact on crime.  
Foreclosures can harm the financial standing of a family, can leave the family without 
ready or quality shelter, and can have other negative impacts. Foreclosures might also 
make neighborhoods less appealing for reasons of aesthetics or affects on property values 
that have nothing to do with crime. Boarded-up buildings due to foreclosures may 
weaken the commitment of residents to a neighborhood and weaken their interest in 
reinvesting in their property. But the concern over foreclosures in many communities lies 
in part with their effect on the safety and security of the neighborhood. More research is 
needed on any additional social or economic costs of foreclosures. 
 This study finds that higher neighborhood foreclosure rates lead to more 
neighborhood violent crime at appreciable levels. While the effect on property crime is 
not found to be statistically significant, the coefficient in the regression is positive. 
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Moreover, property crime related to boarded-up or abandoned homes resulting from 
foreclosures may be less likely to be reported than property crime occurring in occupied 
properties. More research is needed on the relationship between foreclosures and property 
crime. 
A one-percentage-point (0.01) increase in foreclosure rate (which has a standard 
deviation of 0.028) is expected to increase the number of violent crimes in a tract by 2.33 
percent, other things being equal. A full standard deviation increase in the foreclosure 
rate, other things equal, is expected to increase violent crime by 6.68 percent. 
 These findings suggest that foreclosures may have important social and economic 
consequences on neighborhoods beyond effects on the finances of households directly 
affected by the foreclosure. An increase in violent crime is an important social cost – as 
well as an economic cost – that must be incorporated into policymaking concerning real 
estate and mortgage lending policies and regulation.  
 In particular, previous research has shown that subprime mortgage lending leads 
to foreclosures at much higher rates than prime lending (Immergluck and Smith, 2005; 
Quercia, Stegman, and Davis. 2005). This is the first study that systematically estimates 
the effect of foreclosures — many of which followed from subprime loans — on 
neighborhood crime rates. While the results estimating the effect of foreclosures on 
property crime are statistically inconclusive, the results for violent crime are significant. 
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Appendix 
A Hausman Test for Simultaneity 
In the model described in equation (1), there may be a concern about reverse 
causality. That is, there may be a concern that crime, in fact, causes foreclosures as well 
as the other way around, a problem referred to as simultaneity. Crime, for example, may 
encourage homeowners to flee neighborhoods without paying off their loans, increasing 
foreclosure levels.  If simultaneity occurs between crime and foreclosures, ordinary least 
squares would not accurately measure the effect of foreclosures on crime. If simultaneity 
is a problem, then, in addition to the relationship hypothesized in equation (1), the 
complete model would require the incorporation of a second equation explaining the 
effect of crime on foreclosures, such as: 
  
Fi =  a + βι lnCi + β2 Xi + υi      (2) 
 
where Xi is not correlated with the error term, ε,  in the estimation of equation (1). Xi is 
an instrument used to adequately identify the model. Xi must be correlated with 
foreclosures, but not with the residual in the regression estimating equation (1). A 
variable that fulfills these criteria is the median housing value of the census tract. It is 
negatively correlated with foreclosure rate but not correlated with the residual of the 
crime estimation. 
To test for simultaneity with respect to the log of crime variable, we regress, in a 
first stage, foreclosures on all the other independent variables in equation 1, plus the 
instrument (median home value): 
 16
 Fi =  a + γ1Pi + γ2Bi + γ3Zi +  γ4Xi + ωi    (3) 
 
Then, in a second stage, we include ω, the residual from the estimation of equation (3), as 
an additional independent variable in the estimation of a modified equation (1). This is 
done to “correct” for simultaneity (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, p. 305). Thus, we expand the 
original model as follows: 
 
lnCi =  a + b1Pi + b2Bi + b3Zi + b4Fi + b5ωi + εi   (1a) 
 
If ωi is statistically significant in the estimation of equation (1a), then we can 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no simultaneity. However, as shown in Table 4, the 
results of estimating this new equation (shown for the log of violent crime, since that is 
the significant result in Table 3) indicate that this is not the case. The null hypothesis that 
there is no simultaneity can be rejected at any reasonable p value. Thus, there is no 
evidence of simultaneity. 
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Figure 1. Frequency Distributions of Total Crime and Log of Total Crime 
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Figure 2. Partial Regression Plot of Log of Total Crime on Population (assuming 
exogenous variables listed in Table 2). 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
 Mean Std. Deviation 
Log of Violent Crime Incidents 3.5699 0.9968 
Log of Property Crime Incidents 4.9037 0.7240 
Log of Total Crime Incidents 5.1833 0.7235 
Population 3,520.60 2,593.45 
Number of Businesses 85.44 220.81 
Median Family Income in 1999 46,789 26,957 
Unemployment Rate 7.01% 5.39% 
Proportion Below Poverty 0.2156 0.1524 
Percent Female Headed Households 
 
0.2272 0.1755 
Proportion 15 and over Divorced 0.0894 0.0385 
Proportion on Public Assistance 0.0880 0.0872 
Proportion of Residents Who are Male 
Ages 14 to 24 
 
0.1694 0.0713 
Proportion of Households that Rent 0.5676 0.2206 
Proportion of Residents Who have Moved 
within 5 years 
 
0.5191 0.1561 
Percent Black 41.45% 43.25% 
Percent Hispanic 23.38% 28.67% 
Foreclosures in 2001 per Owner 
Occupiable Structures 
0.0238 0.0287 
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Table 2. Pearson Correlations Between Independent Variables and Crime Levels 
 
 Log of 
Violent Crime 
Log of  
Property Crime 
Log of  
Total Crime 
Population 0.429 .620 .601
Number of Businesses 0.056 .344 .296
Median Family Income in 1999 -0.456 .058 -.083
Percent Unemployed 0.373 -.007 .120
Proportion Below Poverty 0.458 -.064 .102
Percent Female Headed Households 0.542 .017 .188
Proportion 15 and over Divorced 0.165 .130 .149
Proportion on Public Assistance 0.459 -.044 .120
Proportion of Males Ages 14 to 24 0.161 -.007 .035 
Proportion of Households that Rent 0.252 .001 .082
Proportion of Residents Moved within 5 yrs -0.130 .081 .026
Percent Black 0.532 .052 .208
Percent Hispanic -0.040 .003 -.030 
Foreclosures in 2001 per Owner-Occupiable 
Structures 0.425 -.018 .119
 
Bold and Underline = Significant at p< 0.01 
Bold = Significant at p>= 0.01 but p<0.05 
Underline = Significant at p>= 0.05 but p<0.10 
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Table 3. Regressions of Neighborhood Crime on Neighborhood Characteristics and Foreclosure Rate, City of Chicago Tracts 
 
 Log of Violent Crime Log of Property Crime Log of Total Crime
  
Coeff. Std. Error
Stndzd 
Coeff. 
 
Sig. 
 
Coeff. Std. Error
Stndzd 
Coeff. 
 
Sig. 
 
Coeff. Std. Error
Stndzd 
Coeff. 
 
Sig. 
(Constant) 0.767 0.142 0.000 2.689 0.135 0.000 2.859 0.127 0.000
Population  4.03E-04 2.08E-05 1.050 0.000 3.40E-04 1.98E-05 1.219 0.000 3.49E-04 1.87E-05 1.251 0.000
Population Squared -1.93E-08 1.88E-09 -0.547 0.000 -1.60E-08 1.79E-09 -0.628 0.000 -1.65E-08 1.69E-09 -0.645 0.000
Number of Businesses 5.37E-04 8.63E-05 0.119 0.000 7.76E-04 8.19E-05 0.237 0.000 7.54E-04 7.75E-05 0.230 0.000
Median Family Income 7.50E-07 1.08E-06 0.020 0.489 4.01E-06 1.03E-06 0.149 0.000 3.85E-06 9.73E-07 0.143 0.000
Unemployment Rate -4.07E-03 4.84E-03 -0.022 0.401   3.66E-04 4.60E-03 2.73E-03 0.937 9.81E-04 4.35E-03 0.007 0.822
Proportion Below Poverty 0.804 0.252 0.123 0.002 -0.184 0.240 -0.039 0.442  0.110 0.227 0.023 0.629
Proportion Female HH 0.597  0.251 0.105 0.018 0.353 0.239 0.086 0.139 0.461 0.226 0.112 0.041 
Proportion Divorced -0.225  0.596 -8.70E-03 0.706 2.451 0.566 0.130 0.000 1.758 0.535 0.094 0.001
Proportion Public Asst -0.300 0.403 -0.026 0.457   -0.024 0.383 -2.91E-03 0.950 0.074 0.362 8.89E-03 0.839
Proportion Male 14-24 -0.234 0.300 -0.017 0.436  0.259 0.285 0.025 0.364 0.030 0.270 2.96E-03 0.911 
Proportion Renting 0.226 0.136 0.050 0.098 -0.113 0.129 -0.034 0.384 -0.045 0.122 -0.014 0.710 
Proportion Moved in 5yrs 0.529 0.178 0.083 0.003 0.897 0.169 0.194 0.000 0.782 0.160 0.169 0.000
Percent Black 0.017 0.001 0.749 0.000 6.10E-03 1.03E-03 0.365 0.000 7.96E-03 9.74E-04 0.476 0.000
Percent Hispanic 0.013 0.001 0.372 0.000 4.66E-03 9.40E-04 0.184 0.000 5.94E-03 8.89E-04 0.235 0.000
Foreclosure Rate 2.328 0.873 0.067 0.008 0.084 0.829 3.32E-03 0.920  0.556 0.784 0.022 0.478
N   806 806 806
R2 0.750 0.572 0.617
  
 
 
Bold and Underline = Significant at p< 0.01 
Bold = Significant at p>= 0.01 but p<0.05 
Underline = Significant at p>= 0.05 but p<0.1
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Table 4. Results of Second Stage of Hausman Test for Simultaneity  
(Estimation of Equation 1a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Log of Violent Crime
  
Coeff. Std. Error 
Stndzd 
Coeff. 
 
Sig. 
(Constant) 0.65483 0.18065  0.000 
Population  4.103E-04 2.191E-05 1.06738 0.000 
Population Squared -1.957E-08 1.911E-09 -0.55656 0.000 
Number of Businesses 5.367E-04 8.628E-05 0.11889 0.000 
Median Family Income 1.376E-06 1.252E-06 0.03722 0.272 
Unemployment Rate -0.00154 0.00546 -0.00835 0.777 
Proportion Below Poverty 0.71623 0.26709 0.10953 0.007 
Proportion Female HH 0.60723 0.25140 0.10688 0.016 
Proportion Divorced 0.25475 0.76519 0.00984 0.739 
Proportion Public Asst -0.83886 0.67273 -0.07339 0.213 
Proportion Male 14-24 -0.23039 0.30034 -0.01647 0.443 
Proportion Renting 0.28865 0.14998 0.06388 0.055 
Proportion Moved in 5yrs 0.50447 0.17951 0.07901 0.005 
Percent Black 0.01397 0.00346 0.60612 0.000 
Percent Hispanic 0.01223 0.00121 0.35166 0.000 
Foreclosure Rate 10.59037 8.30579 0.30528 0.203 
Residual from Stage 1 (w) -8.35434 8.35207 -0.16934 0.317 
  
N 806 
R2 .750 
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